Showing 1 - 10 of 26
In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self-enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60% of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010204680
In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self-enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60 % of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010213411
This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories’ threat to embargo (potential)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281297
A small open economy produces a consumer good, green and black energy, and imports fossil fuel at an uncertain price. Unregulated competitive markets are shown to be inefficient. The implied market failures are due to the agents' attitudes toward risk, to risk shifting and the uniform price for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003969720
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483270
A small open economy produces a consumer good along with green and black energy and imports fossil fuel for black-energy production at an uncertain world market price. Efficient risk management requires curbing fuel consumption, and hence carbon emissions, when consumers are prudent. Moreover,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003879127
In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel and deposits, some coalition of countries fights climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. If the coalition’s policy parameters are the demand and supply of deposits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011415312
Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of non-renewable fossil-fuel resources (= world carbon emissions). Following Eichner and Pethig (2011b) we set up a two-country two-period model in which one of the countries represents a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009489809
This note investigates the suitability of unilateral consumption taxes for alleviating climate change in a two-period two-country general equilibrium model with a finite stock of fossil fuel. We analyze the incidence of a unilateral consumption tax in the first period on world carbon emissions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009489814
In a multi-country model with mobile capital and global pollution this paper analyzes the stability of self-enforcing environmental agreements (IEAs) when the coalition formed by the signatory countries plays Nash. In accordance with previous environmental literature we show that there exists a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010213408