Although gasoline taxes are widely used (nearly) efficient CO2 emission controls, additional fuel-efficiency regulation is applied e.g. in the USA and in Europe. In a simple analytical model, we specify the welfare implications of (i) gasoline taxes, (ii) of 'gas-guzzler taxes' (iii) of...

The European Union fulfills its emissions reductions commitments by means of an emissions trading scheme covering some part of each member state's economy and by national emissions control in the rest of their economies. The member states also levy energy/emissions taxes overlapping with the...

The European Union fulfills its emissions reductions commitments by means of an emissions trading scheme covering some part of each member state's economy and by national emissions control in the rest of their economies. The member states also levy energy/emissions taxes overlapping with the...

We model EU-type carbon emissions control in a group of countries to explore the distributional incidence of mixed policies that consist of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) and of emissions taxes overlapping with the ETS. Such policies impact on national welfares through both the overlapping...

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of non-renewable fossil-fuel resources (= world carbon emissions). Following Eichner and Pethig (2011b) we set up a two-country two-period model in which one of the countries represents a...

In a multi-country model with mobile capital and global pollution this paper analyzes the stability of self-enforcing environmental agreements (IEAs) when the coalition formed by the signatory countries plays Nash. In accordance with previous environmental literature we show that there exists a...

This paper focuses on how emission tax revenues change relative to GNP, when a fixed environmental standard is implemented by an emission tax and when waste abatement, technical and structural change and capital accumulation is accounted for. One- and two-sector growth models are analyzed...

Oates and Schwab (1988) consider an economy with mobil capital and jurisdictions that suffer from local pollution. They show that welfare-maximizing jurisdictions implement the first-best, if they take prices as given and have at their disposal a capital tax and an environmental standard....

In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel and deposits, some coalition of countries fights climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. If the coalition's policy parameters are the demand and supply of deposits...

In Harstad´s (2012) model, climate damage only hits one group of countries, called the coalition, and the coalition´s climate policy consists of capping own fuel demand and supply combined with the purchase of fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstad´s Theorem 1 states that if the...