We study the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and consumers search sequentially for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetric equilibrium, consumers visit firmsrandomly. However, after a merger, because insiders raise their prices...

This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiatedproducts and consumers search for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetricequilibrium, the probability that a firm is the next one to be visited by a consumer is equal acrossfirms not...

See also the article <I>Search Costs, Demand-side Economies, and the Incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition</I> in the 'Rand Journal of Economics'(2013). Volume 44, issue 3, pages 391-424.<P> This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competitionmodel where firms sell differentiated...</p></i>

This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and consumers search the market for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger market equilibrium, all firms look alike and so the probability a firm is next in the queue consumers...

This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated

This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competitionmodel where firms sell differentiated products and consumers search the marketfor satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger market equilibrium, all firms lookalike and so the probability a firm is next in the queue consumers follow...

This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiatedproducts and consumers search for satisfactory deals. In the pre-merger symmetricequilibrium, the probability that a firm is the next one to be visited by a consumer is equal acrossfirms not...