We evaluate the incentives for strategic commodity tax-setting under destination and origin regimes when competition is imperfect and commodity taxes must be used to finance the government budget. Different cases of international duopoly are compared, where firms compete over quantities or...

We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a two-country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents...

We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a two-country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents...

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated...

We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a symmetrictwo-country trade model characterized by monopolisticcompetition and international firm and capital mobility. In thissetting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through therelocation of mobile firms and through changes in the...

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated...

We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a symmetric two- country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and inter- national firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes...

We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a two-country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents...

We analyze non-cooperative commodity taxation in a symmetrictwo-country trade model characterized by monopolisticcompetition and international firm and capital mobility. In thissetting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through therelocation of mobile firms and through changes in the...

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated...