We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of consumers. The firms' available information is...

The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy. We derive the pricing strategies and we analyze...

The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy. We derive the pricing strategies and we analyze...

We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer' preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of consumers. The firms' available information is...

We consider a duopoly model where firms can identify only a share of consumers, which is positively correlated with the consumer’ preferences. Firms charge personalized prices to the consumers they can recognize and a uniform price to the rest of consumers. The firms’ available information...

The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy. We derive the pricing strategies and we analyze...