Savage motivated his Sure-Thing Principle b y arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if an event did not obtain, then it should be preferred overall. The idea that it should be possible to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has...

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f)=μ−ρ(d), where μ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ρ(d) is a...

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f) = mu - rho(d), where mu is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and rho(d) is a...

We provide an axiomatization of an additively separable social welfare function in the context of Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi’s setting to make the lotteries over the identities the observer may assume independent of the social alternative....

We present two axiomatizations of the Second-Order Expected Utility model in the context of the standard models of choice under uncertainty.

We confront two common objections to Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem; one to do with 'fairness', and the other to do with different individuals' having different attitudes toward risk. Both these objections can be accommodated if we drop the reduction axiom; in particular, if we...

We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas "conditional preferences" such as coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of decomposability and disappointment aversion...