We model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non-linear stock dependent costs. We propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase, thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions. We show under what...

The threat of future entry affects the exploitation of common property resources in important ways. An incumbent has a strategic incentive to manipulate the resource stock to deter entry or to harvest more stock prior to entry rather than share the resource with the entrant. It is possible that...

We model countries’ choice of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a dynamic game. Emissions generate immediate benefits to the emitting country but also increase atmospheric GHG concentrations that negatively affect present and future welfare of all countries. Because there are no international...

We use a two-period model to analyze the short run and long run profitability and welfare consequences of horizontal mergers, where the equilibrium responses to a merger can differ over time. Although firms can anticipate the merger, they can only adjust their capacity in the long run.We find a...