Showing 1 - 10 of 14
financement. Il n'y a pas absence de congruence entre les objectifs des entreprises et financiers d'une part et la maximisation du …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008753205
We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270509
We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572471
According to the law and economics approach, pure economic loss is a private loss that is not socially relevant but simply implies a redistribution of wealth. Consequently, wrongful behavior that induces reallocation of costs and benefits with no consequences on social welfare is not considered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008471560
regulatory capture. We characterize in this parameter space the regions where one system dominates the other. À l aide d un …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100693
We characterize the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and banks that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from three factors: the presence of moral hazard, the use of objective functions by firms and banks that differs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100710
industrial accidents. We derive policy implications regarding environmental disaster insurance policies. À l'aide d'un modèle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100766
We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974501
Using a formal political economy model with asymmetric information, we illustrate the conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private financiers is welfare superior, inferior or equivalent to a system based on an incentive regulatory scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012712139
We characterize the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and banks that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from three factors: the presence of moral hazard, the use of objective functions by firms and banks that differs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012725438