We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change it influence her risk attitude in markets.In line with the prediction of Myopic Loss Aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), we find that...

We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or...

We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon the unique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is that there are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange, respectively....

We study an experimental market in which the structure of the information flows is endogenized. When making an offer, traders choose not only the price at which they are prepared to trade, but also the subset of traders they want to inform about the offer. This design allows for two extreme...

In this paper a simple and basic signaling game is studied in an experimental environment. First, we check whether we can replicate some of the findings in the literature concerning equilibrium selection and the use and impact of costly signals. Second, and foremost, the comparative statics...

We experimentally investigate the development of voluntary transfers in an overlapping generations environment. By varying the information conditions of the game, we study whether the development of transfers is related to the possibility of future generations to monitor and reciprocate...

A well-documented anomaly in racetrack betting is that the expected return per dollar bet on a horse increases with the probability of the horse winning. This so-called favorite-longshot bias is at odds with the presumptions of market efficiency.We show that the bias is consistent with betters...

Abstract: We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there is a 50% probability that the message is delivered to the trustor and a 50% probability that the message is replaced by an empty sheet. We...

We study the structure of markets when traders are given the opportunity to create their own market, as on the internet.On the internet, public exchanges have in many cases been replaced by private exchanges.We use experiments to investigate possible reasons for the failure of public...

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally...