We show that acquirer returns are significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and idiosyncratic return volatility. This finding contributes to an explanation of the determinants of, and value gains from, using stock as a method of...

We show that acquirer returns are significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by Ramp;D intensity and idiosyncratic return volatility. This finding contributes to an explanation of the determinants of, and value gains from, using stock as a method...

We study the movement of assets from private to public ownership through two alternative means: the acquisition of private companies by firms that are public (sellouts) or by initial public share offerings (IPOs). We consider firm-specific characteristics for 1,074 IPOs and 735 sellouts from...

This article has two related tasks. First, we review the articles published in this Special Issue on Corporate Control, Mergers, and Acquisitions. These articles provide new evidence on several aspects of corporate control and governance including the value and performance effects of various...

We show that acquirer returns are significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and idiosyncratic return volatility. This finding contributes to an explanation of the determinants of, and value gains from, using stock as a method of...

We address whether mutual funds act effectively through the proxy voting process by supporting wealth increasing items. We examine 212,620 voting decisions made by 1,794 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1,047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. We find that...

We examine shareholder voting on management-sponsored compensation proposals from 1992 through 2003 to determine how voting has evolved as a result of changes in the corporate governance environment. We investigate three questions: have regulatory changes and changes in investor sentiment...

In this paper, we provide evidence concerning the extent to which managers are to blame when their firms become bankrupt. We study a sample of firms that end up in severe financial distress to determine the actions taken by firms' managers as their financial positions worsen. We compare the...

Analysis of 187 proxy contests for board seats from the 1979-89 period indicates that the proxy mechanism made a significant contribution to corporate governance in the 1980s by overcoming obstacles to the market for corporate control, by inducing the removal of incumbent management, and by...

We argue that management sells assets when doing so provides the cheapest funds to pursue its objectives rather than for operating efficiency reasons alone. This hypothesis suggests that (1) firms selling assets have high leverage and/or poor performance, and (2) the stock market discounts asset...