Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of residual claims and control rights in private pensions. The residual claimant is the plan sponsor in a...

What are the equilibrium features of a market where a sizeable portion of traders face career concerns? This question is central to our understanding of Þnancial markets that are increasingly dominated by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio management that...

In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. When the latter kind of...

In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent’s action and information directly on the agent’s action. When the latter kind of...

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and...

In a common agency game, several principals try to in°uence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identi¯ed by Bernheim and Whinston and has found widespread use in the political economy literature....

We develop a methodology to collect and analyze data on CEOs' time use. The idea — sketched out in a simple theoretical set-up — is that CEO time is a scarce resource and its allocation can help us identify the firm's priorities as well as the presence of governance issues. We follow 94 CEOs...

We provide evidence on the match between firms, managers and incentives using a new survey designed for this purpose. The survey contains information on a sample of executives' risk preferences and human capital, on the explicit and implicit incentives they face and on the firms they work for....

Organizational economics has advanced along two parallel tracks, one concerned with motivating agents with diverging objectives, the other - less developed - with coordinating agents with cognitive limits. This survey focuses on the second strand and on attempts to bring the two strands...