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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of … - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325734
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - In: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 9, pp. 1213-1222
, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574271
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Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836656
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Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?
Ertan, Arhan; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2005
Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions and reduces the free rider problem; however, a substantial amount of punishment is targeted on high contributors. In the experiment reported here, subjects are given the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318915
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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546994
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Play it again: Partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2013
Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420270
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Play it Again : Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games
Kamei, Kenju - 2013
Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076291
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Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800357