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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes : An Experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199163
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Do Non-Strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
Anderson, Christopher M.; Putterman, Louis - 2003
interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve. We test the price responsiveness of the demand for punishment by … strategic reason to punish. We nonetheless find significant levels of punishment, and we learn that both price and the extent to … which the recipient's contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076129
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On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning
Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis; Cinyabuguma, Matthias M. - 2005
The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why … punishment is costly and at times misdirected. We document the frequency and probable causes of punishment of high contributors … in several recent studies, and we report a new experiment which shows that introducing higher-order punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064865
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Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186288
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In Broad Daylight : Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2013
about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or … of higher-order punishment opportunities increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the … pattern of punishing and its history, when any subject can punish any other, and when the numbers of punishment and of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014169011
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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes : An Experiment
Putterman, Louis - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149142
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Getting Punishment Right : Do Costly Monitoring or Redistributive Punishment Help?
Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis; Garcia, Bruno - 2008
contributions and punishments change when (a) each dollar lost in punishment must be awarded to another team member and/or when (b … reduce punishment of high contributors (perverse punishment) or increase overall punishing are not completely born out, but … innovation (a)nonetheless succeeds in making the net punishment of high contributors much less common because they receive enough …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220991
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Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas - 2011
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self‐interest should produce a sub‐optimal outcome absent sanctions for non‐cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130732
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Judicial Error and Cooperation
Markussen, Thomas - 2014
Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043224
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731