This dissertation provides theoretical underpinnings for exogenous matching frameworks. The ultimate goal is to improve our understanding of economies whose functioning is impaired by frictions of spatial, informational or institutional nature. Indeed, there is a well established research...

We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and...

We develop a general procedure to construct pairwise meeting processes characterized by two features. First, in each period the process maximizes the number of matches in the population. Second, over time agents meet everybody else exactly once. We call this type of meetings “absolute...

The model of Lagos and Wright [9] alters the meeting friction of the typical search model of money to obtain degeneracy in equilibrium holdings and enhance analytical tractability. It introduces a round of Walrasian ‘centralized' trading after each round of bilateral random ‘decentralized'...

We study an infinite-horizon economy with two basic frictions that are typical in monetary models. First, agents' trading paths cross at most once due to pairwise trade and other meeting obstacles. Second, actions must be compatible with individual incentives due to commitment and enforcement...