Showing 1 - 10 of 42
that for network problems with convex congestion costs, the corresponding games have a non-empty core.If congestion costs … are concave, then the corresponding game has not necessarily core elements, but it is derived that, contrary to the convex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092232
The T -measure is introduces as a method to rank the nodes in a digraph competition.It coincides with the T -value of an associated transferable utility game, the so-called digraph game.The T -measure is characterized in two ways.One of them is based on a characterization of the T -value in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092926
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092639
coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game<br/>has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient … condition for a sequencing<br/>game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time<br/>algorithm to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144428
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … game is called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal … vectors. This paper analyzes the structure of orderings corresponding to larginal vectors of the core cover and conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593461
different voting systems within the same parliamentary body. This paper analyzes the core and the Shapley value of three …-valued simple games. Using the concept of vital players, the vital core is constructed and we show that the vital core is a subset … of the core. The Shapley value is characterized on the class of all three-valued simple games. The model is applied to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268490
This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729181
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181798
In this paper, we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable … based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized. The relation between core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029219
In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable … on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090315