The T -measure is introduces as a method to rank the nodes in a digraph competition.It coincides with the T -value of an associated transferable utility game, the so-called digraph game.The T -measure is characterized in two ways.One of them is based on a characterization of the T -value in...

This paper analyzes network problems with congestion effects from a cooperative game theoretic perspective.It is shown that for network problems with convex congestion costs, the corresponding games have a non-empty core.If congestion costs are concave, then the corresponding game has not...

This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...

In this paper, we introduce a new family of compromise solutions for the class of compromise admissible games. These solutions extend bankruptcy rules. In particular, we show that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule coincides with the barycentre of the core cover and...

The main result of this paper is the convexity of Step out - Step in (SoSi) sequencing games, a class of relaxed sequencing games first analyzed by Musegaas, Borm, and Quant (2015). The proof makes use of a polynomial time algorithm determining the value and an optimal processing order for an...

In this paper minimum coloring games are considered. We characterize the type of conflict graphs inducing simple or three-valued simple minimum coloring games. We provide an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques of conflict graphs inducing such games. Moreover, a characterization of the...

In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out -- Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order....

We define and axiomatically characterize a new proportional influence measure for sequential projects with imperfect reliability. We consider a model in which a finite set of players aims to complete a project, consisting of a finite number of tasks, which can only be carried out by certain...

In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension<br/>of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...