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When preferences are defined over two alternatives, the (relative) majority rule is characterized in terms of the four axioms U, P, I, and G. U is unanimity. P is the condition that the union of two unconcerned (that is, indifferent) groups of individuals creates an unconcerned group. I asserts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147372
Two axioms are shown to characterize the relative majority rule when preferences are defined over two alternatives. According to one axiom, if all the individuals in a group are indifferent, then the associated group preference is indifference. The second axiom states that a group S prefers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008692949
The Hirsch index is a number that synthesizes a researcher's output. It is the maximum number h such that the researcher has h papers with at least h citations each. Woeginger [Woeginger, G. J. (2008a). An axiomatic characterization of the Hirsch-index. Mathematical Social Sciences, 56(2),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795062
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010865859
The problem of aggregating preferences over two alternatives is considered. Three axioms are postulated: unanimity, reducibility (two divergent preferences can be replaced by their aggregation), and anonymity. It is shown that only twelve aggregation rules satisfy the three axioms: the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421772
The majority rule and the hierarchically dictatorial rule are both characterized when preferences are defined over two alternatives. The majority rule is characterized in terms of seven axioms. The hierarchically dictatorial rule is characterized in terms of six of these seven axioms and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550052
The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550053
The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple characterization of the majority rule, for the two-alternative case, that relies on the following property: the choice prescribed by the rule to a group I of individuals must be the one that would...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550057