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This article studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation on the vector space of cooperative games with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011227973
We consider an alternative expression of the Shapley value that reveals a system of compensations: each player receives an equal share of the worth of each coalition he belongs to, and has to compensate an equal share of the worth of any coalition he does not belong to. We give an interpretation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008619182
If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720028
We introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with a fixed but arbitrary player set, which require either invariance of an allocation rule or invariance of the payoff assigned by an allocation rule to a specified subset of players in two related TU-games. Comparisons with other axioms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109081
We introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with a fixed but arbitrary player set, which require either invariance of an allocation rule or invariance of the payoff assigned by an allocation rule to a specified subset of players in two related TU-games. Comparisons with other axioms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587846
In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is used to construct a new axiom of invariance, and to provide a new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value. This characterization only invokes marginalistic principles, and does not rely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945583
We consider communication situations games being the combination of a TU-game and a communication graph. We study the average tree (AT) solutions introduced by Herings \sl et al. [9] and [10]. The AT solutions are defined with respect to a set, say T, of rooted spanning trees of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518103
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