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Monetary policy decisions are typically characterized by three features: (i) decisions are made by a committee, (ii) the committee members often disagree, and (iii) the chairman is almost never on the losing side in the vote. We show that the combination of overconfident policymakers and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048128
We suggest that overconfidence among policymakers explains why formal decision power over monetary policy is given to committees, while much of the real power to set policy remains with central bank chairmen. Overconfidence implies that the chairman underweights advice from his staff, increasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477096
This paper develops a basic model for output fluctuations in traded and non-traded sectors under two alternative monetary policy regimes; exchange rate targeting (or monetary union) and inflation targeting. The conventional wisdom from one-sector models says that inflation targeting gives better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005505202
Business cycles are rarely fully synchronized across sectors. This may be a result of asymmetric shocks, or divergent responses to symmetric shocks, such as monetary policy shocks. If there is imperfect risk-sharing across sectors, there is an argument for letting the central bank stabilize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005232621
Several countries face the choice between targeting inflation independently or entering a monetary union that targets inflation. The present paper extends the theory of optimum currency areas to deal with this choice. In contrast to the conventional theory, countries are shown to form more of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143563
The paper discusses the role of fiscal policy as an instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation when monetary policy pursues inflation targeting. Within a theoretical model of an open economy with a traded and non-traded sector, we show that inflation targeting may lead to large sectoral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143577
We suggest that overconfidence among policymakers explains why formal decision power over monetary policy is given to committees, while much of the real power to set policy remains with central bank chairmen. Overconfidence implies that the chairman underweights advice from his staff, increasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143722
A discretionary monetary policy leads to suboptimal stabilization in models with the New Keynesian assumption of forward-looking price setting, and various policy rules that improve the discretionary equilibrium have been considered in the literature. The empirical evidence for forward-looking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005638026
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000168505
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001702165