This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has...

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has...

We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information by re-analyzing two models of preference evolution, the Arce (2007) employer-worker game and the Friedman and Singh (2009) Noisy Trust game. The techniques include extensions of replicator and...

Can an efficient correlated equilibrium emerge without any exogenous benevolent agent providing coordinating signals? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is...

A growing body of evidence suggests that assets included in market indexes such as the S&P 500 trade at a premium relative to other assets. In this paper we look for evidence of such an index inclusion premium in a carefully controlled laboratory experiment. Our environment involves three assets...

Environment, social and governance (ESG) policies have become important to many investors. We model the interaction between ESG policy proposals and shareholder trading and voting under different sets of preferences, and we test the predictions of our model in a laboratory experiment. In a first...