This paper introduces a theory of market incompleteness based on the information transmission role of prices and its adverse impact on the provision of insurance in financial markets. We analyse a simple security design model in which the number and payoff of securities are endogenous. Agents...

We study an economy with segmented financial markets and strategic arbitrageurs who link these markets. We show that the equilibrium of the arbitraged economy is asymptotically Walrasian in the sense that it converges to the equilibrium of an appropriately defined competitive economy with no...

Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth (or market impact), volume, intermediation costs (such as breadth) etc. No general coherent definition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In...

We study the transmission of liquidity shocks from one sector of the economy to other sectors in a general equilibrium model with multiple trading venues connected by profit-seeking arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs effectively provide liquidity to investors by inter-mediating trades between venues....

We study a model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different market segments. We endogenize the asset structure as the outcome of a security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium asset structure...

We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete asset markets. We show that generically the welfare effect of a change in the information available prior to trading can be in any direction: there exist changes in information that make all agents better off, and...

In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...

We study an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different market segments. We endogenize the asset structure as the outcome of a security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium...

Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth, volume, bid-ask spreads etc. No general coherent denition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In this paper we propose a welfare-based...

At a competitive equilibrium of an incomplete-markets economy agents’ marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equalized ex-ante. We characterize the finest partition of the state space conditional on which this equality holds for any economy. This leads naturally to a necessary and...