We consider the role of product market competition in disciplining managers in a moral hazard setting. Competition has two effects on a firm. First, the expected revenue or the marginal benefit of effort declines, leading to weakly lower effort. Second, the cost of inducing high effort increases...

We consider a rationing mechanism for selling a common-value object. Under certain conditions, the seller earns higher revenue from rationing the object, rather than holding a second-price auction. The mechanism is formally equivalent to dividing the object into k units, and allocating (1/k)...

We consider the portfolio delegation problem in a world with complete contingent claim markets. A principal hires an agent to manage a portfolio. When the agent has limited liability (that is, there is a lower bound on the compensation contract), she may have an incentive to take on excessive...

We consider a model of trade in a limit order market for a single asset, and examine the properties of the microstructure noise (i.e., the difference between the transaction price and the fundamental value). The asset has a common value; in addition, each trader has a private value for it....

We consider a rationing mechanism for selling a common-value object. Under certain conditions, the seller earns higher revenue from rationing the object, rather than holding a second-price auction. The mechanism is formally equivalent to dividing the object into k units, and allocating (1/k)...