We theoretically and empirically examine the role of international takeover markets in curtailing dominant shareholder moral hazard for firms with higher value-added from acquisitions. In equilibrium, such firms strategically list shares in the markets of their targets and voluntarily dilute...

We theoretically and empirically examine the role of the international takeover market in improving corporate governance standards across countries by curtailing dominant shareholder influence - globally, a principal source of agency risk. In our model, firms are privately informed of takeover...

We theoretically and empirically examine the role of international takeover markets in curtailing dominant shareholder moral hazard. In our framework, active international takeover markets provide incentives for firms with higher potential value-added from acquisitions to reduce agency risk from...

Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on CEO compensation during 1993-2006, a period of intense M&A activity. We alleviate endogeneity concerns through dynamic panel...