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The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services
Liu, Fang; Rasch, Alexander; Schwarz, Marco; Waibel, … - 2020
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012315945
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Second opinions and diagnostic uncertainty in expert markets
Baumann, Florian; Rasch, Alexander - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 180 (2024) 1, pp. 74-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487210
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Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: Experimental evidence
Mimra, Wanda; Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - 2016
customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … competition. More customer information does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753240
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What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study
Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - 2013
This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm’s incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm’s financial situation, its competence, and its reputational concerns. We use and complement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753243
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The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services
Liu, Fang; Rasch, Alexander; Schwarz, Marco; Waibel, … - 2020
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220097
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Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets : experimental evidence
Mimra, Wanda; Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - In: Games and economic behavior 100 (2016), pp. 337-352
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771599
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Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets : experimental evidence
Mimra, Wanda; Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - 2016
customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … competition. More customer information does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793497
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What drives fraud in a credence goods market? : evidence from a field study
Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - In: Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics 80 (2018) 3, pp. 605-624
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969531
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What drives fraud in a credence goods market : evidence from a field study
Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - 2013
This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm’s incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm’s financial situation, its competence, and its reputational concerns. We use and complement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754791
Cover Image
Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets : experimental evidence
Mimra, Wanda; Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian - 2013
customers. As experts provide both diagnosis and treatment, this leaves scope for fraud. We experimentally investigate how … to defraud his customers when the expert can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly higher … competition. More customer information does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754802