We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard—increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank’s success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government’s...

We study the composition of bank loan portfolios during the transition of the real sec-tor to a knowledge economy where firms increasingly use intangible capital. Exploiting heterogeneity in bank exposure to the compositional shift from tangible to intangible capital, we show that exposed banks...

We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard—increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank’s success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government’s...

We study the composition of bank loan portfolios during the transition of the real sector to a knowledge economy where firms increasingly use intangible capital. Exploiting heterogeneity in bank exposure to the compositional shift from tangible to intangible capital, we show that exposed banks...

The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank's capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or...

The appropriate level of bank capital and, more generally, a bank's capacity to absorb losses, has been at the core of the post-crisis policy debate. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on how much capital would have been needed to avoid imposing losses on bank creditors or...

We study bank portfolio allocations during the transition of the real sector to a knowledge economy in which firms use less tangible capital and invest more in intangible assets. We show that, as firms shift toward intangible assets that have lower collateral values, banks reallocate their...

We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard - increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank's success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government's...

We find that capital in the range of 15–23 percent of risk-weighted assets would have been sufficient to absorb losses in the vast majority of historic banking crises in advanced economies. Further capital increases would have had only marginal effects on preventing additional crises....

We study the composition of bank loan portfolios during the transition of the real sec-tor to a knowledge economy where firms increasingly use intangible capital. Exploiting heterogeneity in bank exposure to the compositional shift from tangible to intangible capital, we show that exposed banks...