We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.

We consider repeated game forms with incomplete information and state dependent signalling structure. We study the information a player can learn about the state of nature through a communication procedure, in a way robust to unilateral deviations. More precisely, we say that player i can...

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

We define the distance between two information structures as the largest possible difference in value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of distance and use it to discuss the relation between the value of information in games versus single-agent problems, the...

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...