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Beauty and Appearance in Corporate Director Elections
Geiler, Philipp - 2017
in annual reports. We find that shareholders use inferences from facial appearance in corporate elections, as a better … first appointment elections as in the latter cases, shareholders may not as yet be familiar with a director's looks. In … firms with few institutional shareholders and more retail investors owning small equity stakes, the latter tend to rely more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945481
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Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments
Renneboog, Luc - 2018
This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non-executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932676
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The Governance of Director Networks
Renneboog, Luc; Zhao, Yang - In: The Oxford handbook of corporate governance. 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012885105
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US Knows Us in the UK : On Director Networks and CEO Compensation
Renneboog, Luc - 2011
influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130042
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Director Networks and Takeovers
Renneboog, Luc - 2013
We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074605
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Director Networks and Takeovers
Renneboog, Luc - 2013
We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075936
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CEO Social Power, Board Inclusiveness, and Corporate Performance after Ethnic Conflicts
Nazliben, Kamil Korhan; Renneboog, Luc; Uduwlage, Emil - 2023
We investigate CEO power on corporate performance in Sri Lanka, characterized by ethno-linguistic and religious boundaries and complex power hierarchies, and by ethnic conflicts and a subsequent reconciliation process. We focus on a CEO’s social-dominance power, based on ethnicity, gender, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014258042
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Managerial Remuneration and Disciplining in the UK : A Tale of Two Governance Regimes
Renneboog, Luc - 2010
We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135217
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The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK
Renneboog, Luc; Trojanowski, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002
mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders.We find that both the CEO's industry-adjusted monetary compensation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092291
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Managerial compensation
Goergen, Marc; Renneboog, Luc - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 17 (2011) 4, pp. 1068-1077
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009298099