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Managerial Remuneration and Disciplining in the UK : A Tale of Two Governance Regimes
Renneboog, Luc - 2010
We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135217
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Director Networks and Takeovers
Renneboog, Luc - 2013
We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074605
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Director Networks and Takeovers
Renneboog, Luc - 2013
We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075936
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Takeovers and (Excess) CEO Compensation
Feito-Ruiz, Isabel - 2017
We study if a CEO's equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers. When the objectives of management and shareholders are more aligned, as proxied by the use of equity-based compensation, more value-maximizing acquisitions are expected. Whereas in widely-held firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951091
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Beauty and Appearance in Corporate Director Elections
Geiler, Philipp - 2019
We study the role of facial appearance in corporate director (re-)elections by means of director photographs published in annual reports. We find that shareholders use inferences from facial appearance in corporate elections, as a better (higher rated) appearance measure of a director reduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896558
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Insider Trading and Networked Directors
Goergen, Marc - 2019
We analyze the relation between insider trading and the networks of executive and non-executive directors in UK listed companies. While most existing studies focus on firm-specific private information, we find that non-firm-specific information - such as information on other companies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898524
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Beauty and Appearance in Corporate Director Elections
Geiler, Philipp - 2017
We study the role of facial appearance in corporate director (re-)elections by means of director photographs published in annual reports. We find that shareholders use inferences from facial appearance in corporate elections, as a better (higher rated) appearance measure of a director reduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945481
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Acquisition Experience and Director Remuneration
Birhanu, Addis - 2020
We investigate whether acquisition experience of executive and non-executive directors is priced in their remuneration. We find that acquisition experience generates a contractual premium, and the relative size of this premium is higher for non-executive directors than for executives. Only a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826991
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Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments
Renneboog, Luc - 2018
This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non-executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932676
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A State-Stewardship View on Executive Compensation
Liang, Hao - 2013
not just professional managers but are also de facto government officials who are directly state-appointed – even in … from what agency theory predicts. We test this state-stewardship view on China and find that Chinese managers are …-steward managers stimulates not the maximization of shareholder value but the preservation of the state's interests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078675