This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). Ordients have a natural economic interpretation as marginal rates of substitution. Some examples of ordientable binary relations include the...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradients for functions (utilities). The lexicographic order, albeit not representable, has an ordient. Not only binary relations representable by differentiable functions have an...

This note gives a simple proof of the existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, risk-averse agents and heterogeneous beliefs. Our argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a...

This note gives a simple proof of the existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, risk-averse agents and heterogeneous beliefs. Our argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a...

This short paper proposes a didactic example on how to solve a multidimensional screening problem in the linear case. In the proposed example, shareholders of a cash-constrained firm propose to the firm management a recapitalization in counterpart of the distribution of future dividends. The...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (prefer-ences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). The mainmotivation for this study is to replace the binary relation at the center stageof economic analysis, rather than its representation (whenever...

We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...

We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...

This paper generalizes a costly state verification model à la Townsend (1979) along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinion and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multi-lender coalition. Main results are 1) lenders forming the coalition are neither too optimistic...

We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...