This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its (endogenously derived) size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation...

This paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a partnership as the trade-off between efficiency gains and a 'cost' associated with the partial loss of control over the decisions the partnership takes. For instance, by forming a monetary union, countries benefit from a more coordinated monetary...

This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than...

This paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a partnership as the trade-off between efficiency gains and a 'cost' associated with the partial loss of control over the decisions the partnership takes. For instance, by forming a monetary union, countries benefit from a more coordinated monetary...

This paper studies optimal menus of debt contracts such as secured debentures or bonds, in the presence of diversity of opinions between borrowers and lenders. We first characterize incentive compatible contracts, then prove the existence of optimal debt contracts. Finally, we are able to...

This paper generalizes a costly state verification model à la Townsend (1979) along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinion and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multi-lender coalition. Main results are 1) lenders forming the coalition are neither too optimistic...

This paper generalizes a costly state verification model à la Townsend (1979) along two dimensions: 1) diversity of opinion and 2) endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modeled as a multi-lender coalition. Main results are 1) lenders forming the coalition are neither too optimistic...

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two- player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces...

A social game is a generalization of a strategic-form game, in which not only the payoff of each player depends upon the strategies chosen by their opponents, but also their set of admissible strategies. Debreu (1952) proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in social games with continuous...

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments...