Consider a sender and a receiver as two distant nodes in a network. The sender wishes to transmit a secret to the receiver, but faces an adversary controlling an unknown set of nodes. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist \epilson-secret and \epsilon-strongly secure...

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...

A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication network, where some nodes are controlled by an adversary. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist ε-secret and ε-strongly secure communication protocols (∀ε0): if all nodes are obedient the...

This paper considers dynamic implementation problems with evolving private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism such that the social choice function is implemented by an arbitrary large number of...

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. The authors characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is...

This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...

An ambiguous statistical experiment is a set of joint probability distributions over states and signals. This note compares ambiguous experiments from the point of view of an ambiguity averse decision maker and extends the Blackwell (1951, 1953) ordering to this setting

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...