We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...

We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...

We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...

This paper studies optimal menus of debt contracts such as secured debentures or bonds, in the presence of diversity of opinions between borrowers and lenders. We first characterize incentive compatible contracts, then prove the existence of optimal debt contracts. Finally, we are able to...

In simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown that optimal debt contracts are simple debt contracts where borrowers repay a fixed interest rate whenever possible and lenders seize all the profit when...

This note gives a simple proof of the existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, risk-averse agents and heterogeneous beliefs. Our argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a...

This note gives a simple proof of the existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, risk-averse agents and heterogeneous beliefs. Our argument is based on the concept of nondecreasing rearrangement and on a...