Similar Search Results

The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256568

Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009) 1, pp. 72-93

In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801517

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Reuben, Ernesto; Suetens, Sigrid - In: Experimental Economics 15 (2012) 1, pp. 24-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866234

Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 122-137

We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603338

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - 2009

Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265993

Everyone is a winner: promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition

Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2009

We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i … are absent if groups perform at the same level and it therefore does not eliminate low-cooperation equilibria. We find … that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269308

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269498

Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277839

Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2012

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283979