Dynamic principal-agent settings with asymmetric information but no commitment are well known to create a ratchet effect. Here, the most efficient agents must be provided with extra 'information rent' as an incentive to relinquish their informational advantage over an uninformed principal; this...

We consider two aspects of the commitment problem in price regulation with lobbying the ratchet effect and the hold-up problem. We set out a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where the regulated firm can ‘buy influence’ in a lobbying equilibrium. Firms can sink...

This paper examines optimal price (i.e. ‘sliding scale’) regulation of a monopoly when productivity and managerial effort are not observed. We show how to operationalise this model of incentive regulation and use actual data from electricity distribution in England and Wales to make welfare...

This paper examines optimal price (i.e. 'sliding scale') regulation of a monopoly when productivity and managerial effort are not observed. We show generally how to operationalize this model of incentive regulation and use actual data from electricity distribution in England and Wales to...

This paper examines a general problem exemplified by post-auction (third generation---`3G') mobile telecommunications markets. When entering these (or any other) markets, firms must often decide on the degree of coverage (`roll-out') they wish to achieve. Prior investment must be sunk in order...