Similar Search Results

The effect of gender and gender pairing on bargaining : evidence from an artefactual field experiment

D'Exelle, Ben; Gutekunst, Christine; Riedl, Arno - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012388081

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2021

claims acquired in the past seem to create strong entitlements that shape current negotiations. Despite their importance, the … role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320555

Moral property rights in bargaining

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001666040

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001387224

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - In: Games and economic behavior 50 (2005) 2, pp. 278-311

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002612914

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with an ultimatum bargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition decision, whereas the values of the 2-person coalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711650

Weakening the weak may harm the strong : a bargaining model where opting-in is costly

Riedl, Arno - 1995

negotiations, joint ventures or interfirm cooperation. This paper studies such situations. A "strong" and a "weak" player have to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693903

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999 - This version: February, 1999

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-personcoalitionformation game with an ultimatumbargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301150

Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2004

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262122

Information, uncertainty, and subjective entitlements in bargaining

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Riedl, Arno - 2010

negotiations following the production. By means of a laboratory experiment, we systematically investigate their role for the whole …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274419