We analyze the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic agents by examining how media exposure of board ineffectiveness affects corporate governance, investor trading behavior, and security prices. The results suggest that media releases of (noisy) information have significant...

We analyze whether the nondisclosure of accrual information at earnings announcements might contribute to the abnormal accrual anomaly. Prior studies draw inferences about the pricing of (abnormal) accruals at earnings announcements and around the filing dates through analyses of the long-term...

Prior studies suggest that managers use their reporting discretion to signal their private information. Because of the litigation risk associated with inflating earnings, we conjecture that managers are more likely to use their reporting discretion to signal favorable private information when...

We analyze the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic agents by examining how media exposure of board ineffectiveness affects corporate governance, investor trading behavior, and security prices. Our focus on board quality is motivated by the strong media criticism to which...

We analyze whether the nondisclosure of accrual information at earnings announcements might contribute to the abnormal accrual anomaly. Prior studies draw inferences about the pricing of (abnormal) accruals at earnings announcements and around the filing dates through analyses of the long-term...

Prior studies suggest that managers use their reporting discretion to signal their private information. Because managers are often assumed to use their discretion to mislead investors, we conjecture that, without a second corroborating signal, discretionary accruals are likely to be regarded as...

Regulators and shareholders generally oppose any restriction on clients' rights to sue their auditors, believing that such restrictions would impair reporting quality. However, the evidence suggests that the opposition to limitation of liability agreements (LLAs) between clients and auditors is...