Similar Search Results

The emergence of weak, despotic, and inclusive states

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - 2017

. We develop a dynamic contest model of the potential competition between state (controlled by a ruler or a group of elites …) and civil society (representing non-elite citizens), where both players can invest to increase their power. The model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011786762

Indirect rule and state weakness in Africa : Sierra Leone in comparative perspective

Acemoglu, Daron; Chaves, Isaías N.; Osafo-Kwaako, Philip; … - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011562946

Indirect rule and state weakness in Africa : Sierra Leone in comparative perspective

Acemoglu, Daron; Chaves, Isaías N.; Osafo-Kwaako, Philip; … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360563

When is a state predatory?

Robinson, James A. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013408224

From current-day Russia to Porfirio's Mexico

Robinson, James A. - In: Studies in comparative international development 38 (2003) 3, pp. 81-92

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001904356

Political losers as a barrier to economic development

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - In: The American economic review 90 (2000) 2, pp. 126-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001502606

Political losers as a barrier to economic development

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675349

When is democracy an equilibrium? : Theory and evidence from Colombia's 'La Violencia'

Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003409197

When is democracy an equilibrium? : Theory and evidence from Colombia's La Violencia

Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003330752

When is Democracy an Equilibrium? : Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"

Chacon, Mario - 2006

The conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465870