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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madies, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041
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Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Bjedov, Tjaša; Madiès, Thierry; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251784
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Price Discrimination Through Communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2011
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246715
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The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084038
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Quitting and Peer Effects at Work
Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2012
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899503
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Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
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The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - CESifo - 2012
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539149
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The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279295
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Quitting and Peer Effects at Work
Rosaz, Julie; Slonim, Robert; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313
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Persuasion and Limited Communication
Sher, Itai - Department of Economics, University of Minnesota - 2008
to accept. Communication is limited in that the arguments available to the speaker depend on her information. Optimality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747298