We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome,...

This paper develops a model in which colleges seek to maximize the quality of the educational experience provided to their students. We deduce predictions about the hierarchy of schools that emerges in equilibrium, the allocation of students by income and ability among schools, and about the...

Two significant challenges hamper the analyses of the collective choice of educational vouchers. One is the multi-dimensional choice set arising from the interdependence of the voucher, public education spending, and taxation. Second, even absent a voucher, preferences over public spending are...

cycle.

We study the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education. This conflict arises because older households without children have weaker incentives to support the provision of high quality educational services in a community than younger households with school-age children. We...

The analysis of educational vouchers has evolved from market-based analogies to models that incorporate distinctive features of the educational environment. These distinctive features include peer effects, scope for private school pricing and admissions based on student characteristics, the...

In this paper we develop a model in which students choose their university coursework based on both investment and consumption incentives. We show that these education decisions are socially inefficient. This result is driven by the fact that students do not consider an externality in the...