We study the optimal design of mechanisms for the private provision of public goods in a simplesetting in which donors compete for a prize of commonly known value. The optimal mechanism in thismodel is the lowest-price all-pay auction – a mechanism in which the highest bidder wins but...

In this paper, we compare the cause and effect of immaterial rewards and sanctions oncooperation in a voluntary contributions experiment. We find that both rewards andsanctions increase contributions only when subjects interact repeatedly, though rewardsseem to be more effective than sanctions....

We consider a dynamic homogenous oligopoly in which firms set prices repeatedly. Theory predicts that short-run price commitments have an increasing impact on profits and may lead to less price stability. The experiments that we conduct provide support for the first effect and against the second...

Prediction markets serve as popular devices to aggregate beliefs and to assess market estimated probabilities. By looking at the interaction between real- and play-money prediction markets, this paper shows that traded volume has a significant positive effect on the probability of real- and...

In the infinite horizon alternating price setting duopoly of Maskin and Tirole (1988), a focal price equilibrium and an equilibrium consisting of Edgeworth cycles coexist. In this study we investigate which of these two equilibria is more likely to emerge by means of a laboratory experiment. In...

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales. This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high prices only to be possible as an...

We study procurement auctions held in sequential and simultaneous formats. For thelatter format, we find less bid participation and more aggressive bidding for projects withstrong common value components and more competition for projects having strong privatevalue components.

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigates the impact of institutions and institutional choice in constant-sum sender-receiver games. We compare individual sender and receiver behavior in two different institutions: A sanction-free institution which is given by the bare...

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where cho-sen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales.This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high pricesonly to be possible as an...

The presence of synergies in recurrent procurement auctions leads to an exposure problem and asymmetries among bidders. We consider sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies in a setting with four bidders. In a series of experiments we compare the performance of the two pricing...