We analyze a labor market with search and matching frictions where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union. We take a benevolent view of the union in assuming it to care equally about employed and unemployed workers and we assume, moreover, that it is fully rational, thus taking job...

We analyze a labor market with search and matching frictions where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union. We take a benevolent view of the union, assuming it to care equally about employed and unemployed workers, to treat identical workers in identical jobs the same, as well as to be...

We model a labor market with search and matching frictions where some or all workers belong to a (centralized) union, both in the case where coverage is exogenously given and where it is endogenous. Unions are assumed to choose identical wages for all unionized workers, and firms are assumed not...

Revised May 2016. We analyze a labor market with search and matching frictions in which wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union. Frictions render existing matches a form of firm-specific capital that is subject to a hold-up problem in a unionized labor market. We study how this hold-up...

A labor market with search and matching frictions, where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity, is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup. With full commitment to future wages, the union achieves efficient hiring in the...