We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said...

A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination...

We present an application of relation algebra to measure players strength in a social network with influence between players. In particular, we deal with power, success, and influence of a player as measured by the Hoede-Bakker index, its generalization and modifications, and by the influence...

A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination...

In this paper, we analyze a spatial model of coalition formation with data from Dutch elections and with theoretical results. First, we study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political...

Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational algorithms for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain...

We present an application of relation algebra to measure players' 'strength' in a social network with influence between players. In particular, we deal with power, success, and influence of a player as measured by the Hoede-Bakker index, its generalization and modifications, and by the influence...

In this paper, we analyze a spatial model of coalition formation with data from Dutch elections and with theoretical results. First, we study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political...

We consider a model of competitive opinion formation in which three persuaders characterized by (possibly unequal) persuasion impacts try to influence opinions in a society of individuals embedded in a social network. Two of the persuaders have the extreme and opposite opinions, and the third...

We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said...