In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment,...

In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment,...

In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profi…t and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that...

Under the current market structure in the TV industry advertising prices are typically set by TV channels while viewer prices are set by distributors (e.g., cable operators). The latter implies that the distributors partly internalize the competition between the TV channels, since they take into...

We consider a model of a TV oligopoly where TV channels transmit advertising and viewers dislike such commercials. We show that advertisers make a lower profit the larger the number of TV channels. If TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes, there will be underprovision of advertising...

The TV industry is a two-sided market where both advertisers and viewers buy access to the programs offered by competing TV channels. Under the current market structure advertising prices are typically set by TV channels while viewer prices are set by distributors (e.g. cable operators). The...

This paper analyses how competition between media firms influences the way they are financed. In a setting where monopoly media firms choose to be completely financed by consumer payments, competition may lead the media firms to be financed by advertising as well. The closer substitutes the...

We consider a model of strategic informative advertising where the advertising is done on TV and where the TV channels' advertising prices are endogenously determined. We discuss how these prices, and the advertising firms' advertising efforts, vary with the two key parameters of the model: the...

The key to an understanding of the TV industry is the market for TV advertising. We present a model of this market that also encompasses the product markets and the viewer market. Because viewers dislike commercials, there is congestion in advertising, and TV channels offer complementary goods...

We consider a model where TV channels transmit advertising, and viewers dislike such commercials. We find that the less differentiated the TV channels’ programs are, the lower is the amount of advertising in equilibrium. Relative to the social optimum, there is underprovision of advertising if...