We analyze the competition between two newspapers in a vertical differentiation model where the qualities of the journals are determined endogenously in the first stage of the game. We show that when the advertising revenues per reader increase there is a critical value above which the quality...

We consider a situation of duopolistic competition in the press industry, involving two editors competing in both the newspapers' and advertising markets. The population of readers in this market is differentiated in terms of their attitudes toward advertising; some of them are assumed to be...

We study access pricing by platforms providing internet services ot pay-TV to users while they allow advertisers to have access to these users against payment via ads or banners. Users are assumed to be ad-haters. It is shown that equilibrium access prices in the users'market are increasing in...

The press industry depends in a crucial way on the possibility of financing an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts. We show that this induces the editors of the newspapers to moderate the political message they display to their readers in order to make their newspaper...

In this paper we model a situation of competition between two editors who are rivals in both the newpapers' and advertising industries.. To identify the consequences of this competition, we analyse a two-period sequential game whose players are the editors each selling a differentiated...