We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1, ...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1, ..., xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1, ..., pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is...

We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary domains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier literature, this is not the case for...

We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen when the best alternative is removed; and so on. We show that this is the...

A measure of association is row-size invariant if it is unaffected by the mutliplication of all entries in a row of a cross-classi…cation table by a same positive number. It is class-size invariant if it is unaffected by the mutliplication of all entries in a class (i.e., a row or a column). We...

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive...

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable –though perhaps different– commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two...

We study the problem of defining inequality-averse social orderings over the space of allocations in a multi-commodity environment where individuals differ only in their preferences. We formulate notions of egalitarianism based on the axiom that any dominance between the consumption bundles of...

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the...

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population...

We offer an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.