We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the...

We offer an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.

A measure of association is row-size invariant if it is unaffected by the multiplication of all entries in a row of a cross-classification table by a same positive number. It is class-size invariant if it is unaffected by the multiplication of all entries in a class (i.e., a row or a column). We...

We study the problem of deriving a complete welfare ordering from a choice function. Under the sequential solution, the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen when the best alternative is removed; and so on. We show that this is the...

A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free...

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that...

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering...

We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary do-mains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier litera-ture, this is not the case...

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of...

We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to...