In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best response dynamic startingfrom the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence ofevery adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, inGSS, global stability can...

This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. Compared to related models, this model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, it...

In this paper, I construct a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. This model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, I show that every economy...

Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the...

This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best-response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability...

We study proliferation of an action in a network coordination game that is generalized to include a tractable, model-based measure of virality to make it more realistic. We present new algorithms to compute contagion thresholds and equilibrium depth of contagion and prove their theoretical...

This paper studies models where the correspondences (or functions) under consideration are never increasing (or weakly decreasing) in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games where endogenous variables are strategic substitutes for each...

We generalize standard models with complementarities used widely in economics and other disciplines. We unify and expand their foundations, increase their scope of application, and identify previously unknown structural relationships among equilibrium sets in these models. Widely used results...

Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the...