Compliance with a social norm is a matter of self-enforceability and endogenous motivation to conform which is relevant not just to social norms but also to a wide array of institutions. Here we consider endogenous mechanisms that become effective once the game description has been enriched with...

Drawing on the theoretical and experimental literature on distributive justice, we put some assumptions of the contractarian argument to an empirical test by means of an experiment which investigates the influence that explicit agreement under the veil of ignorance may have on individuals’...

This chapter introduces a notion of social/ethical norm that integrates its description as a self-sustaining regularity of behavior with the normative meanings of the statements by which a norm is formulated in the moral language. This definition is applied to organizational ethics where the...

This work aims at filling a gap in the cognitive representation of institutions, starting from Aoki’s account of institutions as equilibria in a gametheoretical framework. We propose a formal model to explain what happens when different players hold different representations of the game they...

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’ – the risk of abuse of authority – we propound the conception of a Social Contract Theory of the Firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the Social Contract Theory of the Firm...