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Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information

Nickerson, David B. - In: Journal of economics 60 (1994) 2, pp. 125-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001173181

Player importance and forward induction

Amershi, Amin H. - In: Economics letters 38 (1992) 3, pp. 291-297

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Probationary contracts in agencies with bilateral asymmetric information

Sadanand, Asha B. - In: The Canadian journal of economics 22 (1989) 3, pp. 643-661

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001073666

Equilibria in non-cooperative games

Sadanand, Asha B. - In: Bulletin of economic research 46 (1994) 3, pp. 197-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001285929

Equilibria in non-cooperative games

Sadanand, Asha B. - In: Bulletin of economic research 47 (1995) 2, pp. 93-113

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001285931

Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry : a choice between commitment and flexibility

Sadanand, Asha B. - In: Journal of economic theory 70 (1996) 2, pp. 516-530

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001206629

Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: A Choice between Commitment and Flexibility

Sadanand, Asha; Sadanand, Venkatraman - In: Journal of economic theory 70 (1996) 2, pp. 516

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007622668

Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility

Sadanand, Asha; Sadanand, Venkatraman - In: Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996) 2, pp. 516-530

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159639

Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information

Nickerson, David; Sadanand, Asha; Sadanand, Venkatraman - In: Journal of Economics 60 (1994) 2, pp. 125-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005679070

Probationary Contracts in Agencies with Bilateral Asymmetric Information.

Sadanand, Asha; Sadanand, Venkatraman; Marks, Denton - In: Canadian Journal of Economics 22 (1989) 3, pp. 643-61

This paper examines a two-period principal and agent model where the agent's ability level is not observable to the principal and revealed to the agent only after the contract is signed. The value of the agent's output to the principal is affected by the agent's collegiality, which is unknown to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005271828