We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, corporate governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with weak shareholder rights hold less cash, in contrast to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between shareholder...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance...

Les entreprises européennes et américaines détiennent une part de plus en plus importante de leurs actifs sous forme de trésorerie, alors que la sophistication financière croissante devrait les aider à réduire la trésorerie. Après un état des lieux sur les niveaux de trésorerie en...